



The Netherlands comprehensive action programme to combat jihadism

Overview of measures and actions



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Introduction

The threat posed by (global) jihadism and the necessity to prevent terrorist attacks call for a robust, offensive and comprehensive programme which combats both the hard core of jihadists and the dissemination of their violent ideas, both by means of penal and administrative measures. In combatting the jihadist movement, it is important to prevent the growth of new adherents by countering radicalisation and by diminishing the breeding ground.

This action programme is a comprehensive one and has three objectives: to protect democracy and the rule of law, to combat and weaken the jihadist movement in the Netherlands and to remove the breeding ground for radicalisation.

In the following existing measures are designated with the letter 'E', measures that will be strengthened are designated with the letter 'S' and new measures are designated with the letter 'N'.

(E) = Existing measure

(S) = Strengthened measure

(N) = New measure

The measures listed in the programme can be divided into five groups:

1. Risk reduction regarding jihadist travellers:

The risks posed by jihadist travellers are limited with all available means.

- a. These include penal, administrative and social measures directed at jihadist travellers so that they do not do more damage.

2. Travel interventions:

Potential departures are prevented or disrupted.

3. Radicalisation:

- a. Recruiters and persons who disseminate the jihadist ideology are disrupted; their reach is actively limited; and the spread of their radical messages is brought to a halt.
- b. Radicalisation is detected and countered; the increase of new adherents to the jihadist movement is prevented and alternative and opposing views and narratives are encouraged.
- c. Social tensions are also countered as these could represent a breeding ground for radicalisation.

4. Social media:

The online dissemination of radicalising, hatred-inciting and violent jihadist content is combatted.

5. Information-sharing and cooperation:

In order to optimise the effectiveness of all the organisations involved, we invest in knowledge, skills and partnerships at the local, national and international level.

The action programme contains a glossary with a description of all relevant terms and abbreviations used (see page 30).

Risk reduction of jihadist travellers

Limiting the risks posed by jihadist travellers with all means available



- (S) 1. **Verified departees who join terrorist militias are subject to criminal investigation.**
 - a. Participation in terrorist armed struggle in terrorist training is a punishable offence under sections 134a and 140a of the Dutch Penal Code.
 - b. International jurisdiction is optimally used to prosecute Dutch nationals who commit international crimes in conflict zones.
 - c. When there is sufficient suspicion, an international alert will be issued for their arrest.
 - d. Departees are arrested upon return and face criminal prosecution (with due regard for operational needs and the principle of discretionary prosecution).

- (E) 2. **Suspects and persons convicted for terrorist crimes are placed in the Terrorist Ward (TW), in accordance with current regulations.**
 - a. Prisoners who before or during their detention radicalised or recruited others are also placed in the TW.¹

- (E) 3. **There are various options available in criminal law to place returnees under long-term supervision.**
 - a. The court can impose a (partially) suspended sentence, which requires the person convicted to meet specific conditions during a probationary period.
 - b. If the court has imposed a non-suspended prison sentence of more than one year, conditions may be imposed on the person involved in the context of conditional release.

- (N) c. Legislative proposal 33 816 (which currently is before the House of Representatives) provides for the introduction of a long-term, behaviour-influencing and custodial measure for hospital order patients and sex and violent offenders. This measure is imposed for a limited number of years, but can always be extended.
- d. It is being considered if the custodial order for repeat offenders (ISD) can also be declared applicable returnees who have been convicted for any type of crime.

1. Article 20(a) of the Selection, Placement and Transfer of Prisoners Order

(N) 4. Dutch nationality will be stripped from verified departees who join terrorist militias.

- a. The amendment of The Netherlands Nationality Act expands the possibilities to strip Dutch nationality in case of terrorism convictions has presently been submitted.
- b. In addition, the Act will be further amended to allow Dutch nationality to be stripped without prior criminal conviction when Dutch nationals voluntarily enlist in the armed forces of a terrorist militia.
- c. This will only apply to those departees who have more nationalities besides the Dutch one. The majority of current departees holds dual nationality (Dutch and non-EU nationality).
- d. Those who Dutch nationality is stripped will be listed as undesirable foreign nationals (for the Schengen area) and will be declared undesirable foreign nationals (section 67 of the Dutch Aliens Act). This is based on a report of the intelligence and security services (AIVD, MIVD) to the IND, which states that the person involved poses a threat to national security.

(S) 5. Verified departees with a non-EU nationality are declared undesirable foreign nationals (for the Schengen area).

- a. If applicable, the IND will revoke residence status.
- b. If the person involved returns, he will be declared an undesirable foreign national and will be deported.

(N) 6. Verified departees with one or more nationalities who join a terrorist militia are reported to the authorities of those countries (of their non-Dutch nationality).

This is done as long as the reporting is consistent with existing information-sharing practices, with due regard for the national and international rule of law and with due regard for compelling legislation and regulations prohibiting such reporting to certain countries.

(S) 7. If there are sufficient grounds to assume that the departee has joined a terrorist militia, his Dutch travel documents are refused or declared invalid.

European investigative services (and border control) will have the mandated authority to seize such Dutch travel documents.

(S) 8. Verified departees who join a terrorist militia are placed on the national terrorism list.

- a. All their assets will be frozen. All financial services refused.
- b. Everyone - and this includes friends and family - who directly or indirectly makes funds available to him risks prosecution.

(S) 9. Verified departees are immediately removed from the Persons Database (BRP) and any benefits, financial allowances and student finance are terminated. If and when required, laws will be amended.

- a. The qualifying organisation, such as the police or the AIVD, informs the municipality of the verified departee.
- b. The objective of removal from the BRP is to stop entitlement to benefits, financial allowances and student finance. If and when required, laws will be amended. If necessary, benefits are immediately stopped.

(S) 10. Those with malicious intent will have a more difficult time acquiring means with which to launch attacks.

- a. The availability of products that are used to make explosive devices at home will be limited. Market participants also have to report suspicious transactions, disappearances and theft of such products. Other EU member states are taking similar measures based on EU Directive 98/2013.
- b. Enforcement in the pyrotechnic sector will be strengthened and more attention will be paid to tackling the source. Therefore, we will seek to tighten the rules at the European level regarding the sale of professional fireworks.
- c. Sharing information, investigation and the collection of intelligence regarding (attempts to) acquire means with which to execute attacks will be intensified, particularly regarding the availability of firearms in criminal circles and in the area where criminal circles and jihadist networks meet.
- d. In cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, the AIVD and the Dutch National Police, continuous research is done regarding existing and new means and methods with which attacks are mounted and whether additional counter-measures are required.

(N) 11. Administrative measures for risk reduction of jihadist travellers.

- a. A proposal for a temporary act for administrative powers is being prepared to reduce the risks and to prevent serious crimes from being committed by terrorist fighters who return to the Netherlands.
- b. This could include temporary measures such as a periodic duty to report, contact bans, cooperation with relocation, et cetera to prevent further radicalisation of the returnee, to prevent him from spreading his radical ideas and to prevent recruitment.

Jihadists who leave or return to the Netherlands face penal and/or administrative sanctions. If a disillusioned or traumatised jihadist wishes to leave the jihadist movement, he can make us of:

(E) 12. Consular assistance from Dutch embassies in bordering countries.

Assistance with (re)establishing contact with family and regular consular assistance for jihadists who want to leave the jihadist movement.

(N) 13. A new exit facility in the Netherlands (to be set up).

Ex-jihadists will be counselled and closely supervised under strict conditions by the exit facility. Guidance will be offered to work toward a better future. Psychological support may be a part of this process.

Travel interventions

Preventing or disrupting potential departures



- (S) **14. In case of a reasonable suspicion of departure, penal actions are taken.**
 - a. Potential departees are arrested as suspects.
 - b. They face criminal investigation if at the time of departure they had plans to commit terrorist-related offences abroad, whether alone or as part of a terrorist organisation.
 - c. If circumstances indicate that a potential departee is intending to join a terrorist militia, an alert is issued for his arrest and he will be arrested by the KMar at border control.

- (S) **15. If there are sufficient grounds to assume departure, the travel documents are refused or declared invalid (including identity documents).**
 - a. Passports are declared invalid based on section 23 of the Passport Act if there are sufficient grounds to assume that a person will commit actions abroad that pose a threat to the Netherlands.
 - (N) b. Travelling on a Dutch identity document outside the European Union and the European Economic Area (Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein) will be rendered impossible with a travel ban for the person whose passport was refused or declared invalid for these reasons.

- (S) **16. If case of a suspected departure, the immediate circle is informed.**

The mayor is informed and alerts the person's immediate circle in order to prevent departure.

- (E) **17. If a minor is involved in a suspected departure, child protective measures are taken.**

The Child Care and Protection Board initiates an investigation, unless application of juvenile criminal law is called for. Based on its investigation, the Board may request the court to (temporarily) place the minor under supervision or to place him in (foster) care, or to take other fitting measures.

Radicalisation - disrupting disseminators and recruiters

Disrupting recruiters, facilitators and disseminators of jihadist propaganda



(S) 18. A criminal law intervention is initiated in case of recruitment for armed struggle.

Recruiting persons for violent jihadism has been made punishable by law in the Dutch Criminal Code (Sr). More specifically, section 205 Sr mentions the recruitment of persons for foreign armed forces or armed struggle and section 134a Sr mentions participating and assisting in terrorist training.

(S) 19. Criminal law intervention in case of hate speech and inciting violence in an extremist context is prioritised.

- a. This applies to hate-speech against any ethnic, social or religious community. The glorification of the violent struggle can be tackled with the current legal instruments.
- b. The displaying of flags of banned terrorist organisations who commit violence against certain population groups, in combination with other supportive expressions, is punishable on the grounds of Articles 137c through 137e of the Dutch Criminal Code. Action will be taken against this by the Public Prosecution Service. Nationwide expertise is being strengthened with which the units can be supported in this approach.

(N) 20. Facilitators and distributors of jihadist propaganda are disrupted in their activities.

- a. Online and offline producers and distributors of jihadist propaganda will be identified (see also measure 29). This information is actively shared with the institutions that have the authority to act (such as the organisations participating in the local case management teams) and relevant service providers.
- b. Aside from criminal prosecution, administrative measure are taken in order to disrupt (investigation into housing or benefits fraud, nuisance reports or youth care reports). In addition, it is under consideration to apply the current legislative proposal regarding the imposition of a code of conduct in regard to housing (fine, coercive administrative action)² to jihadist disseminators, facilitators and recruiters.

2. Legislative bill of MP Dijkhoff (Domestic Nuisance Action Act)

- c. It is being investigated whether preachers of hate can be kept out of the local risk-areas by extending the law for special measures for urban issues (The Rotterdam Act) with regard to selective granting of housing on the grounds of nuisance or criminal behaviour. Screening is based on criminal convictions or on the basis of police records regarding hate speech, incitement to violence and other criminal convictions.
- d. Verified facilitators are placed on the national terrorism list (see also measure 8).
- e. It is furthermore under consideration whether the draft bill mentioned in measure 11 can provide supplemental possibilities for administrative control and disruption of distributors and facilitators.
- f. Preachers from countries whose nationals require a visa, who incite hatred and violence, will be refused a visa.
- g. In counteracting the distribution of the jihadist message by radical preachers there is close cooperation with the mosques and imams in the Netherlands.

Counteracting radicalisation

Detecting radicalisation, preventing the increase of new adherents to the jihadist movement, and stimulating opposition

Countering social tensions because these could also be a breeding ground for radicalisation



There is cooperation with front-line professionals in numerous disciplines and across civil society.

- (S) **21. Cooperating with the Muslim community.**
 - a. Imams and mosque administrators in the Netherlands are allies in the battle against extremists who hijack their faith and mislead and abuse their children.
 - b. Periodic consultations with imams address the following themes:
 - i. Countering radicalisation: early detection, alternative and oppositional narratives, social roles of imams and connection with society and local government.
 - ii. Upbringing: Quran education (increasing transparency and strengthening the educational and pedagogical climate), enhancing informal parenting support and dilemmas concerning identity building.
 - iii. Opposing discrimination, islamophobia and the hatred of Muslims.
- (N) **22. Strengthening of existing networks of local and national key figures.**
 - a. A (national) confidant supports key figures in the Muslim community who express opposition and take a clear stand against jihadism. They receive media training and assistance.
 - b. Key figures who are threatened and intimidated, are supported and where necessary, are included in the Surveillance and Protection System.
 - c. Local networks of key figures that are open to discussing sensitive issues within their own community (like alienation, radicalisation and jihadist travel) are expanded further and trained.
- (S) **23. Concerned citizens can count on support.**
 - (N) a. A national radicalisation contact point is being set up for all forms of extremism and jihadism. Concerned citizens and front-line professionals can anonymously report serious concerns about radicalisation, recruitment and jihadism. Reports are assessed and appropriately processed (at the most relevant institution).
 - (N) b. A support facility is being set up based on the German ('Hayat') model in which family members, friends or people related in another way (for example teachers) of radicalised, radicalising individuals or departees, are supported and if need be, are brought into contact with people in the same situation.

- c. Networks amongst youngsters and their educators are being strengthened. Here an easy access to professional supportive education is stimulated (both for general rearing support issues as well as lifting specific, educational ‘taboos’ such radicalisation and jihadist travel).

(S) 24. Support for educational institutions.

- a. Educational institutions that are known to have people present who are active in a jihadist network, or educational institutions who have requested assistance in this respect, are supported. Experts in the field and confidants from the education inspectorate support these educational institutions. These institutions are informed and advised about the issue and the possible approach. This makes it possible to recognise and deal with vulnerable youngsters, and to work on resilience as well.
- b. Up-to-date information about radicalisation will be placed on the web portals of educational institutions.
- c. In order to encourage active citizenship and social integration of pupils and students, educational institutions are further supported in the programming of their citizenship training.
- d. Educational institutions have a general task to stimulate citizenship. The government will take measures if administrators or others responsible for educational institutions publicly support terrorist groups.

(N) 25. Establishment of an expert centre on social tensions and radicalisation.

- a. The expert centre enhances the information position and networks of the government and municipalities regarding social tensions and radicalisation.
- b. The early detection and monitoring of radicalisation and social tensions is intensified, especially geared towards the areas with the greatest conflict potential.
- c. The expert centre provides practical support to municipalities and social institutions in case of radicalisation and social tensions.
- d. An (online) community with relevant stakeholders will gear itself towards an effective approach and gain access to an up-to-date overview of (online) radicalisation and triggers for social tensions. This will put local structures in a better position to report and to interpret signs and identify possible follow-up interventions.

- e. A common platform of know-how on the prevention of radicalisation and social tensions in the social sphere (youth, parenting, education) will enlarge the knowledge base amongst professionals, which means that signs of alienation of the community can be detected soon and tackled more adequately.
- f. In-depth research will provide a greater insight into trigger factors in vulnerable groups for radicalisation and in the influence of (inter)national developments in the field of social tensions.

(S) 26. Directed action aimed at radicalising young persons in local risk areas.

- a. Directed action in local risk areas with a high conflict potential, by way of recovery of the social infrastructure and local networks.
- b. In conjunction with the national government, educational institutions (apprenticeship supervisors), youth workers and employers, the young persons that are vulnerable to radicalise will be identified. An individually tailored approach will be drawn up. Part of this approach is the creation of alternatives, such as jobs, sports or schooling. Naturally, reciprocal requirements will be drawn up for the arrangements.
- c. Social neighbourhood teams in the municipalities involved are trained in detecting and countering radicalisation, in line with the current decentralisation policy of the social sphere (comprehensive approach towards households).
- d. Strengthening local information-sharing with relevant services (such as the police or AIVD), similar to the existing pilot ‘tackling subversive criminality’ in underprivileged neighbourhoods.

(S) 27. Mobilising societal opposition and enhancing resilience against radicalisation and tensions.

- (N)**
- a. A facility is being created to stimulate alternative and oppositional views and narratives and to enhance the resilience of the rule of law. This concerns small-scale initiatives to disseminate alternative messages, both via local networks and meetings, as well as via social media.
 - b. Examples of initiatives that can be supported:
 - i. Local information sessions in relevant communities about recruitment and online dangers for youngsters.
 - ii. Communal initiatives to unmask jihadist manipulations and to repudiate the ideological message.

- iii. Dissemination of information that portrays negative experiences with jihadism from the inside (for example experiences by ex-jihadists).
- iv. Initiatives geared towards the intensifying of the dialogue amongst the communities about radicalisation and excessive behaviour.
- c. Connecting to existing alternative and oppositional (international) islamic views and narratives. The Muslim community is encouraged to increase access to the statements by (foreign) authoritative scholars opposing the jihadists movement.
- d. The national and local government actively and specifically communicate about misleading information or rumours. Factual inaccuracies in the jihadist propaganda are corrected by providing insight into the objectives, choices and implementation of the Dutch government's national and international policies.
- e. Civil society (community workers, imams, community police officers, education personnel, communal organisations) is supported by this factual information in the discussions that they conduct with youngsters who are susceptible for radicalisation.

(S) 28. Social debate about the rules of law.

In order to curb the spread of extremism, it is important that the underlying values of democracy and the rule of law are shared and propagated. This calls for a permanent effort by all those involved, in which space is given to opposing voices. The government stimulates societal initiatives that discuss conflicting values, the boundaries of the rule of law, and living together with differences.

Social media and the internet

Combatting the dissemination of radicalising, hatred-inciting and violent jihadist content

- (N) 29. **Combatting the dissemination of radicalising, hatred-inciting and violent jihadist content.**
- a. A citizen's hotline: concerned citizens can report jihadist (terrorist, hatred-inciting and violence-glorifying) content on the internet and social media.
 - b. Producers and distributors of online jihadist propaganda and the digital platforms that they abuse, are identified.
 - c. This information is actively shared with the institutions who are authorised to act and also with relevant service providers (including internet services).
 - d. A specialist team at the National Police combats online jihadist content. This team informs the Public Prosecution Service about possible punishable statements. If the application of the voluntary code of conduct does not lead to removal, an order under criminal law could follow. In the draft bill on Computer Criminality III it is proposed to improve this procedure further (Notice and Take Down).
 - e. This team consults with internet companies about effective banning and refers content to them so that they can test the content against their own conditions and terms of use (Notice and Take Action).
 - f. Internet companies that continue (after being warned) to facilitate 'listed' terrorist organisations through the spreading of jihadist content, risk sanctions. This depends on either the basis of an amendment of EU Regulation 2580/2001 in combination with the National Sanction Regulation Terrorism 2002, or on the basis of future national regulations.
 - g. The specialist team monitors independently, but works in close cooperation with the online citizen's hotline.
 - h. A current list of online jihadist (social media) websites is published. This list can be used by communities, professionals and parents to warn their environment.

Information exchange and cooperation

Optimising the effectiveness of the involved organisations by investing in knowledge, expertise and partnerships at the local, national and international level



LOCAL

- (E) **30. The cabinet supports the local approach in prioritised areas.**
- In all the prioritised municipalities in the Netherlands, multidisciplinary case management teams have been set up in which primary professionals share their expertise information about signs of jihadist radicalisation, departees and returnees, for the benefit of a shared assessment. They also draw up an individually tailored intervention plan. The implemented interventions are case-dependent and vary in intensity, form and degree of coercion. They are implemented where they have the greatest effect.
 - The NCTV makes experts available for the municipalities directly involved. The experts support the municipalities in their assessments concerning jihadism. They stimulate and encourage early detection, help identify intervention possibilities and strengthen relevant networks.
 - Under the chairmanship of the Minister of Security and Justice, consultation about the local approach regularly takes place between the NCTV, the Head of the AIVD, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the mayors of the prioritised municipalities.
- (E) **31. Continued collaboration between the government and the municipalities involved.**
- The government and municipalities agree to a pact for the prevention of radicalisation and the control of social tensions. This pact sets out the integrated approach and collaboration between municipalities, local partners (welfare, social affairs), educational institutions and the police.
 - The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment will establish a joint inter-departmental team for the prevention of radicalisation and social tensions, which supervises the implementation of the measures for combatting radicalisation and social tensions. The team consists of the departments and municipalities involved.

NATIONAL

(S) 32. Strengthening the coordination of operational implementation.

- a. The AIVD, NCTV, the police, OM and municipalities share all available and relevant information in order to determine the most effective intervention (intelligence, penal and/or administrative) and to maintain an overview of the comprehensiveness (notwithstanding the existing lines of authority, structures and legislative frameworks).
- b. The CT infobox supports this information exchange and is reinforced to be able to contribute to the creation of a national overview of the jihadist movement.
- c. The National Police sets up a coordinating NSGBO. The NSGBO, together with the SGBOs from the police units, assembles all the existing expertise, measures and forces in the field of prevention, repression and the response in the case of an actual attack.

- (N) d. For an optimal coordination of the implementation of the measures in this Action Programme, an up-to-date and detailed centralised overview will be maintained by the NCTV of the measures taken in individual cases.

(S) 33. Prioritising the financial tackling of jihadists.

- a. The Dutch Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) has prioritised the inventorisation of the financial situation of possible jihadists and facilitators, and charts the (financial) relationships for the OM and investigation services.
- b. The FIU draws up profiles with risk indicators of the institutions that have an obligation to report, to be able to trace possible financial transactions of jihadists and facilitators.

(N) 34. Improving detection of jihadists travel movements.

Reservation and check-in information from the aviation industry can currently not be used in a structured manner to detect jihadist travellers. Therefore, jihadist travel movements from, within and to Europe cannot be identified in a sufficient and timely manner.

- a. The Dutch National Police, the AIVD, the KMar and customs must be able to consult reservation and check-in information to detect jihadist travellers. The goal is to have airline companies that operate in the Netherlands structurally provide this information to the government. The government closely cooperates with the aviation industry.

To this end:

- i. A technical portal will be set up to provide a single facility to consult and receive reservation and check-in information.
 - ii. A legislative bill will be submitted in order to create a legal basis that would allow the collection of reservation and check-in information from the aviation industry. This information may only be used in combatting terrorist offences (under the Framework Decision 2002/475/JBZ regarding counter-terrorism) and the most serious forms of crime (as included in the Framework Decision 2002/584/JBZ regarding the European arrest warrant and surrender procedure between the Member States) as well as for involvement in war crimes.
 - iii. The Netherlands and fourteen other European Member States that are currently developing similar measures will strive to achieve European exchange of jihadist travel information as quickly as possible.
- b. Pending the discussion with the Dutch Parliament about legislation to expand powers regarding the collection and use of reservation and check-in information, the construction of the technical portal will be initiated. This will be done with a European grant and within already existing legal frameworks. This enables an improvement in the detection of jihadist travellers in the short term.

(S) 35. Increasing expertise in operational implementation.

- a. Specialised teams that have knowledge and skills in tackling jihadism are being set up within relevant organisations. Such teams are already in place at the Dutch Probation Service and the Child Care and Protection Board. The NCTV has developed specific information and specialist training courses and has published them in the 'Toolbox Extremism' on its website.

- (N) b. The NCTV will establish an accredited specialist curriculum for employees of institutes and organisations involved in combatting jihadism.
- c. Front-line professionals in the prioritised municipalities are trained in recognising jihadist radicalisation and in acting accordingly.
 - d. The manual for local authorities, which lists possible measures and interventions, has been made available on the NCTV website.
 - e. Expertise regarding terrorist behaviour and travel patterns is strengthened at the KMar, the police and customs.

INTERNATIONAL

- (S) **36. Intensifying international cooperation regarding jihadist travellers³.**
- a. The Netherlands plays an active role in the informal EU-group ‘jihadist travellers’⁴. The recently drawn up European action plan is currently being implemented. Central to this plan is information-sharing about jihadist travellers at the European level.
 - b. Within the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), the Netherlands and Morocco continue their leading role.
 - c. The AIVD plays a leading role in the European Counter Terrorism Group regarding jihadist travel movements to and from Syria. At the initiative of the AIVD, a close collaboration between several European intelligence and security services has been set up.

(S) **37. Optimisation of existing detection means.**

This concerns reporting, detecting and usage of detection means in operational practice. The goal is to timely detect Dutch nationals who commit international crimes in conflict zones and to prosecute them. The detection means/actions concerned are:

- a. Schengen Information System (SIS-II):
 - i. The frequency of detection of jihad travellers will be raised by all European partners involved: all persons who meet the risk criteria will be identified.
 - ii. SIS-II will be linked to the national list of wanted persons (OPS). This ensures that international jihadist travellers are identified when they come into contact with police.
 - iii. The informal EU group (mentioned in 36.a) has proposed to the European Commission to add a new category to the SIS-II for jihadist travellers.

- (N)
- b. Interpol Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD):
 - i. All passports that have been nationally registered to be confiscated and declared invalid will be entered into Interpol’s SLTD through the SIS-II.
 - ii. The use of the SLTD will be added to the standard checks at the border.

3. The international term is *foreign terrorist fighters*.

4. Previously designated as the group of nine EU countries with which the Dutch Minister of Security and Justice regularly meets to discuss jihadist travellers.

(S) **38. Enhancing proactive information-sharing.**

The Netherlands strives to proactively and systematically improve information-sharing between European Member States regarding *terrorist travel*:

- a. At a European level, operational conditions will be created for effective international information-sharing.
- b. Intensive cooperation takes place with the European Member States involved and with the US, Canada and Australia.
- c. A joint letter of intent has been drawn up for the proactive sharing of information between the Member States involved, as proposed in the aforementioned informal EU group.

Glossary

This glossary is intended to increase the action programme's readability.⁵

AIVD: Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service.

al Qa'ida: a jihadist terrorist network of groups, cells and individuals who fall under the direct operational command of al Qa'ida's leadership.

Assets and financial services: all financial assets and services, including insurance services and insurance-related services and all banking services and other financial services.

BRP: Persons Database, formerly known as the Municipal Personal Records Database (GBA).

Conflict potential: the probability that social tensions result in conflict.

CT-Infobox: the Counter Terrorism Infobox is a cooperative of partners dealing with terrorism. Partners in the CTI are the AIVD, the Dutch National Police, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND), the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service and Economic Investigation Service (FIOD), the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar), FIU-NL, the Public Prosecution Service, the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate and the Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD).

Declaration of invalidation: the invalidation or the decision to have a travel document declared invalid.

Departee: a person with Dutch nationality or a Dutch residence status who with jihadist intent travelled from the Netherlands to join a terrorist organisation in a jihadist conflict zone.

5. Definitions in legislation may deviate.

Digital platforms: all online media that can be used for the dissemination of information.

Disrupt: the whole of administrative and operational actions, aimed at the early risk reduction of a threat.

Disseminators: persons who disseminate jihadist propaganda.

Extremism: the designation of the phenomenon that involves people or groups breaking the law and executing (violent) illegal actions to influence political decision-making in an extra parliamentary manner.

Facilitator: a person who gives or has given others the opportunity, means or information in support of the jihadist struggle.

Front-line workers or professionals: professionals who through their job are in direct contact with citizens (such as community police officers, teachers).

Immediate circle: family members or relatives with whom intensive contact is maintained.

IND: Immigration and Naturalisation Service.

International crimes: an umbrella (non-exhaustive) term for core crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

ISIS: acronym of Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham that controls parts of Syria and Iraq. Often also referred to as IS or ISIL, Islamic State and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, respectively.

Jihad: an Islamic term, usually interpreted in the Islamic tradition as 'an effort for a good cause'. Its primary meaning is ethical in nature: man has the divine task to fight evil within him. The second meaning of jihad is to make efforts in the interests of Islam and the Islamic community. A third meaning is armed struggle.

(Global) jihadism: an ideological movement of political Islam which is based on a specific interpretation of Salafist teachings and on the works of Sayyid Qutb and seeks a global dominance of Islam and the establishment of an Islamic state (caliphate) through armed struggle (jihad).

Jihadist: individual who sees him-/herself as part of the jihadist movement and endorses jihadist teachings.

Jihadist content: texts, images, videos and audio recordings that propagate jihadism and glorify the jihadist movement.

Jihadist movement: the whole of (international) networks, groups, cells and individuals who are active supporters of the ideology and strategy of jihadism.

Jihadist propaganda: the dissemination of information to create a support base for jihadism.

Jihadist traveller: a person who travels or has travelled to join a terrorist organisation in a jihadist conflict zone.

KMar: Royal Netherlands Marechaussee.

Listed terrorist organisations: terrorist organisations that are included in the UN and/or EU list of terrorist organisations.

MIVD: Netherlands Military Intelligence and Security Service.

National terrorist list: a list of persons and organisation declared to fall under the Anti-Terrorist Sanctions Order.

NCTV: National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism.

Notice and Take Action: alerting Internet Service Providers and asking them to test the contents of websites against their terms and conditions of use.

Notice and Take Down: reporting (alleged) punishable contents at Internet Service Providers by the Public Prosecution Service in order to have the contents removed from internet, in accordance with the Notice-and-Take-Down code of conduct.

NSGBO: National Large-scale Special Operations Unit.

OM: Public Prosecution Service.

Potential departee: a person with Dutch nationality, a Dutch residence status, an EU nationality or residence status in another EU Member State who intends to travel from the Netherlands in order to join a terrorist organisation in a jihadist conflict zone.

Radicalisation: an attitude that shows a person is willing to accept the ultimate consequence of a mind-set and to turn them into actions. These actions can result in the escalation of generally manageable oppositions up to a level they destabilise society due to the use of violence, in conduct that deeply hurts people or affects their freedom or in groups turning away from society.

Recruiter: a person who without permission from the King recruits another person for foreign armed forces or armed struggle.

Returnee: a jihad traveller with Dutch nationality or a residence status in the Netherlands who has returned to the Netherlands or another country in the Schengen area, or a jihadist with a residence status, an EU nationality or residence status in another EU Member State from the Schengen area that has come to the Netherlands.

Schengen area: comprises 26 countries that have signed the Schengen Agreement which allows the free movement of persons.

Schengen Information System (SIS-II): an automated database used by the investigative services and prosecuting organisations in all Schengen countries that gives permanent insight into international investigative information of the other partners to the 1985 Schengen Agreement.

SGBO: Large-scale Special Operations Unit.

SZW: Social Affairs and Employment.

Terrorism: from ideological motives threatening, preparing or using serious violence against people, or actions intended to cause severely disruptive social damage, with the purpose of effecting changes, inciting fear among the population or influencing political decision-making.

Terrorist militia: an organisation, network or entity of which the allied persons wage an armed struggle with terrorist intent.

Terrorist organisation: organisation included in the UN and/or EU list of terrorist organisations.

Terrorist Ward: a ward in a penal establishment that is specially geared towards terrorism suspects and persons convicted of terrorism with the goal of limiting their radicalising influence on other prisoners.

VenJ: Ministry of Security and Justice.

Verified departee or returnee: a person identified by the Dutch authorities.



This is a publication of
Ministry of Security and Justice
National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment

29 August 2014